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Abstract 
Inequality has acquired a newfound prominence in academic and political debate. While scholars 
working with the capability approach (CA) have succeeded in influencing the conceptualisation 
and measurement of poverty, which is increasingly understood in multidimensional terms, recent 
scholarship on inequality focusses overwhelmingly on economic forms of inequality, and especially 
on inequalities in income and wealth. In this paper we outline how the conceptual framework of 
the CA (focusing on ends rather than means, multidimensionality, and recognising the value of 
freedoms as well as attained functionings) has the potential to enrich the study of distributional 
inequality through offering a rationale for why inequality matters, exploring the association 
between different forms of inequality, and providing an analysis of power. But applying the CA in 
the context of advantage exacerbates some existing challenges to the approach (defining a 
capability list, and the non-observability of capabilities) and brings some fresh ones (especially 
insensitivity at the top of the distribution). We recommend a stronger and clearer distinction 
between concepts and measures. Capability inequality is a more appropriate and potentially 
revealing conceptual apparatus, but economic resources are likely to remain a crucial metric for 
understanding distributional inequality for the forseeable future. 
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Introduction 
Distributional inequality – the gap between the rich and poor – is receiving attention in academic 
and political debate as never before. High-profile contributions by Piketty (2013) and others have 
been accompanied by pronouncements from the World Bank about the importance of ensuring 
that ‘prosperity’ is shared; reducing inequality within and between countries is one of the UN’s 17 
Sustainable Development Goals. The capability approach (CA) has made significant progress in 
influencing the conceptualisation and measurement of poverty, especially in cross-national settings 
and concerning the global south, but its reach in terms of discussions about distributional 
inequality is so far limited.  
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In this paper, we seek to explore the conceptual terrain opened up by viewing the debate on 
distributional inequality through a capability lens, and to point to some issues that must be 
considered if we are to do so. Through its emphasis on the distinction between means and ends, 
and its insistence on multidimensionality, the CA has broadened the focus of poverty research 
from monetary resources to multiple dimensions of deprivation. In contrast, the majority of the 
work on distributional inequality has used metrics of income and wealth, interpreting them in most 
cases uncritically as markers of advantage and disadvantage. Moreover, the value of freedoms, in 
addition to actual attainments – another key feature of the CA – is largely missing from analysis of 
inequality. However, extending the scope of the CA to embrace distributional inequality gives rise 
to some tricky issues, especially in terms of operationalisation and measurement.  
This paper therefore addresses two challenges. The first is to examine what a capability-inspired 
study of inequality might look like and what – if anything – the approach can contribute, 
conceptually speaking, to the study of distributional inequality. The second is to explore whether 
shifting our focus from a more traditional concern with poverty or capability deprivation to one 
of inequality raises new issues for the capability approach, or casts a new light on some more 
familiar debates within the capability literature.  
Our argument consists of three central claims. First, there has been substantial progress made in 
the field of inequality over the past decade, but that this progress has not depended to any great 
extent on insights from the capability approach. Second, that a capability lens can potentially add 
value to this field by opening up a wider range of reasons for concern about inequality, by 
expanding the forms of inequality under consideration, and offering the basis for an analysis of 
power that goes beyond purely economic means. And third, that the study of inequality raises new 
challenges and issues for the capability approach: that the study of advantage adds still-more 
complexity to an already complex framework, and may mean that a shift away from income and 
wealth as measures of inequality, may be neither feasible nor desirable.  
We should note, however, that the paper does not seek to address two further, related questions, 
each of which is important in its own right. The first is the full normative justification for concern 
with inequality, however conceived. We do not attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of 
justice based on the capability approach, specifying which types of inequality are and are not 
legitimate. Rather, we argue for the more modest claim that the capability perspective expands the 
potential grounds for concern with distributional inequality on which a comprehensive theory 
could draw. The second question we do not attempt to answer is what measurement indices are 
best for the job. Considerable progress has already been made on these technical aspects (see for 
example Krishnakumar, 2014; Aaberge and Brandolini, 2015). As regards measurement, our focus 
is primarily on the types of variables that might be used in measurement (eg whether resources or 
capabilities; and the specific dimensions) rather than the particular measurement index used to 
summarise these, though we recognise that both are fundamental components of the practice of 
inequality measurement.  
The remainder of the paper consists of five sections. The next section clarifies and defines different 
kinds of poverty and inequality analysis, and gives examples of where recent literature on inequality 
fits into this classification. We then outline a capability perspective on distributional inequality, 
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which serves to highlight the contribution that a focus on people’s capabilities can make to this 
field. The penultimate section identifies three issues that the focus on inequality raises for the 
capability approach, while the conclusion argues that a clearer distinction between concepts and 
measures would help to ensure that the benefits of the distinctive contribution of the CA to 
understanding inequality can be reaped without harvesting at the same time a new crop of 
operational problems. 
Metrics, thresholds and distributions 
All sorts of analysis can be found under the banner of ‘inequality’: Gini coefficients of the income 
distribution, differences in the proportion of boys and girls accessing basic education, and so forth. 
In order to provide clarity for the subsequent discussion in which our focus is specifically on 
inequality rather than poverty, and on multidimensional and vertical inequality rather than any 
other varieties, we set out in Figure 1 a decision tree for identifying types of analysis. The set of 
boxes on the right of the figure give examples of the output that could be generated by taking 
different routes through the tree.  
The first step (A), familiar to capability theorists, is to choose a metric: economic resources, 
functionings, or capabilities. The second step (B) is to decide whether the focus will be on poverty 
– that is, assessing whether people fall below a threshold of some kind – or on inequality – that is, 
considering the whole distribution. Poverty thresholds are defined in a wide range of ways, but 
even those that are defined in relative terms (eg 60% of median income) give rise to measures of 
poverty rather than of inequality, because the focus is on people below that threshold, rather than 
on the shape of the distribution or the gap between the rich and poor. Inequality measures are 
many and various, including the Gini index, 90:10 ratio, and comparison of central tendencies 
(averages), but what they have in common is an attempt to provide information about the range 
of values observed in the population. The third and final step (C) distinguishes horizontal (between 
group) from vertical (within group) comparisons, noting that for ‘within group’ comparisons the 
group may be defined as the whole population. This step is often conflated with step B but is in 
fact distinct. For example, using an income metric, an analysis of vertical inequality (B2 C2) would 
yield information about the overall shape of the distribution, horizontal inequality would compare 
the position of different groups of the population (ethnic groups, for example) in the income 
distribution (B2 C1), horizonal poverty analysis would compare the poverty rates of different 
ethnic groups (B1 C1), while vertical poverty analysis would give overall poverty (B1 C2). In 
particular, horizontal poverty analysis, the comparison of poverty risks across groups, is often 
described as analysis of gender/ethnic/other ‘inequality’ but since the focus remains on assessing 
the extent to which different groups are below a given threshold, it is clearer to retain the term 
‘poverty’ for this type of application.  
Recent scholarship on inequality has focussed primarily on economic resources as the metric of 
inequality (A1 B2) (most notably Piketty, 2013), whether within-country or globally between 
countries (Milanovic, 2011; Bourguignon, 2015). There has been considerable attention to the 
share of income accrued by the richest 1% of the income distribution, where increases in inequality 
have been particularly concentrated (eg Atkinson, 2015; Jenkins, 2016). Other studies have 
examined the consequences of wide economic inequalities for individuals, societies and for the 
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environment (Stiglitz, 2013; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Davison, 2016), although the extent of 
causal links is contested (eg Rowlingson, 2011; Salverda et al, 2014). This body of research is multi-
dimensional in terms of the outcomes considered, but the metric of inequality remains firmly 
economic resources (A1).  
Other strands of research focus on health inequalities (eg Marmot, 2005) and educational 
inequalities (eg Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014) but in the majority of cases these are concerned with 
how health and educational outcomes vary by household income or some other proxy for 
economic resources. Analysis of the distribution of health or educational attainments per se – the 
gap between the most and the least healthy, the most and the least educated for example – is 
uncommon, but this would be required to shift the classification to an analysis of functionings or 
capability inequality (A2 or A3). 
Meanwhile, within the capability literature, although Sen’s early essay on the capability approach 
was entitled ‘Equality of what?’, not ‘Poverty of what?’, much of what has followed has focused 
on the extent to which people are able to enjoy basic capabilities – a poverty concept – rather than 
on inequality itself (A3 B1 rather than A3 B2). Nussbaum’s central human capabilities are 
understood to be minimum standards that should be guaranteed to all. The Multidimensional 
Poverty Index, as the name suggests, counts people who fall below the relevant thresholds (A2 
B1). The Human Development Index (HDI) captures achievement across the full range, but is 
presented on the basis of country-averages, though the annual Human Development Reports also 
feature information about the distribution of health, life expectancy and income in their inequality-
adjusted HDI measure (e.g. UNDP, 2015: 66-68) (A2 B2). Empirical work using the capability 
approach more generally has extensively examined the prevalence of capability poverty, often 
multidimensionally (Chiappero Martinetti and Roche, 2009) (A2 B1); documented the lack of 
overlap with income poverty (Hick, 2016b); and investigated differences in the incidence of 
capability poverty between men and women, between ethnic groups, between regions and between 
countries (Robeyns, 2003, Alkire and Santos, 2014, Wang et al, 2015) (A2 B1 C1).  
The inequality literature offers a rich analysis of the stretch and spread of income and wealth 
distributions, especially at the top end, and examines some of the consequences, but rarely offers 
analysis of inequality in other dimensions in their own right. The capability literature, both 
conceptual and empirical, offers a rich analysis of multi-dimensional poverty, but rarely offers 
analysis of inequality itself (the inequality-adjusted HDI is one exception). We do not learn very 
much about the magnitude of the gaps between the capability-rich and the capability-poor, and 
even less about the top end of achievement, or capability advantage, or about how advantages 
across multiple dimensions are concentrated amongst a privileged elite. So there appears to be a 
gap – in principle. The next section turns its attention to what fillling this gap would actually entail. 
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Figure 1: Decision tree for poverty and inequality analysis, with examples
Example outputs
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A capability perspective on distributional inequality 
A focus on ends not means, multidimensionality, and recognition of the value of freedom over 
and above achieved beings and doings are three distinctive, though by no means unique, features 
of the CA (Robeyns, 2016). In this section, we argue that each of these features has the potential 
to make the conceptualisation of inequality in capability space worthwhile.  
Ends not means 
One central motivation for the CA is that resources or ‘means’ like income and wealth are an 
imperfect proxy for valuable ends, and that we do better to concentrate our analysis directly on 
the beings and doings that people value and have reason to value. If this argument holds for 
analysis of poverty and deprivation, surely it holds for inequality too. 
This simple observation has some appeal but let us begin with some counter-arguments. Firstly, 
someone might object that while it makes sense to consider whether people do or don’t have a 
basic set of capabilities, capabilities themselves do not have a distribution. Either you are literate 
or you are not; either you participate in elections or you do not: these capabilities do not have a 
distribution from less to more.  
However this is too narrow a view of capabilities. Capabilities are not only basic or central 
capabilities – there are non-basic ones as well, and a broader definition of a given capability will 
facilitate distributional analysis. For example, if we focus not on just on ‘literacy’, which embodies 
within it the idea of a (low) threshold, but on the capability of learning, we can draw constrasts 
between different distributions. In Ancient Greece, the spectrum of learning ran from illiterate 
slaves to philosopher-scholars: the magnitude of the gap between high and low achievement was 
large. In contrast, in modern-day Sweden, with free universal early years provision through to 
college education, and extra resources for children with special needs, the gap between high and 
low achievement is comparatively small. These examples are chosen to illustrate the contrast, but 
comparisons between contemporary societies, even those within a given region of the world, could 
also be instructive. 
Moreover, examining the whole distribution of a capability such as learning will reveal different 
information than that provided by a focus on functioning-poverty. Some societies may do well in 
ensuring that few fall below a minimum standard, but allow very wide inequalities to open up 
above that level. Other societies may have high rates of learning-poverty but relatively low levels 
of inequality. In other words, the shape of the distribution will vary between countries, as well as 
the overall stretch from top to bottom. This observation in turn generates research questions 
around what contextual and policy factors affect the shape of the distribution, and who is situated 
where in the distribution (horizontal inequalities).    
A second objection might be that when we move away from basic or central capabilities, we open 
up the possibility of ‘bad’ capabilities. The basic capability of being able to vote in elections could 
be considered part of the broader capability of ‘political participation’, at the top end of which we 
might include setting the terms of the debate through control of mass media outlets or exercising 
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one’s powers as a member of a ruling elite. Capabilities at this level arguably harm others: can they 
properly be considered capabilities? If capabilities are defined as real or substantive freedoms, it 
can be argued following Kant (Scruton, 2001) that the capability concept excludes harmful 
capabilities by definition: violence and exploitation may be powers or abilities but they are not real 
freedoms. Valuing and promoting real freedom cannot include valuing capabilities that harm other 
people.   
Sen acknowledges Kantian moral philosophy as one of the foundations of the capability approach 
(Sen, 2009), but he rejects the notion that capabilities are by definition good capabilities, or only 
those that are not harmful to others. The idea of capability, “does not go with any kind of belief 
that all capabilities must been seen to be valuable and to be cherished, rather than, in many cases, 
resisted and restrained” (Sen, 2012, p.xiii). Robeyns (2016) concurs, and delineates two distinct 
steps: in the first place, the identification of the evaluative space (capabilities), and in the second, 
the selection of the capabilities that will be the focus of the evaluation. The first step does not 
imply any judgement about whether the contents of the space is good or bad, it simply defines the 
space as containing the relevant type of ‘objects’ for the evaluation. The second step implies that 
positive or negative value is attributed to the selected capabilities. In capability analysis of poverty 
and disadvantage, it is appropriate to select capabilities that people ‘value and have reason to value’. 
In capability analysis of inequality and advantage, it may be necessary to add capabilities that people 
do not have reason to value (in the Kantian sense), but which are relevant to understanding the 
nature of advantage.  
A third possible objection to changing the focus of inequality analysis from resources to 
capabilities is that while there may be sound philosophical grounds for concern about income and 
wealth inequality, no such case has been established in relation to capability inequality. Indeed Sen 
(2009) has gone to some lengths to assert that it is not his aim to offer a complete theory of justice. 
Hence it is perfectly reasonable that inequality analysis should focus on income and wealth, in 
which, for example, Rawlsian liberal egalitarians have a clear interest, and not on capabilities.  
But there are two reasons to believe that capability inequality analysis could be useful, even without 
such a comprehensive theory in place. The first is that capability inequalities in dimensions like 
health, education and self-respect may have instrumental significance for capability poverty. A 
parallel argument has become widely accepted in the economic inequality literature: wide income 
inequalities make poverty reduction more difficult (White and Anderson, 2001). So even if one 
does not care about inequality itself, one may need to identify and reduce (capability) inequalities 
to expedite progress in relation to (capability) poverty.  
The second reason brings us back to the simple observation with which this sub-section began. 
Capabilities are preferred to resources as a metric of well-being because resources are converted 
at different rates into valuable capabilities according to a person’s characteristics and circumstances 
(their conversion factors). There is no reason to believe that variation between people in the rate 
of conversion of income and wealth into valuable ends applies only at the bottom of the 
distribution. Hence if conversion factors are a key part motivation for moving from material 
resources to multiple dimensions in assessing well-being, they are also likely to apply in assessing 
inequality. Assessments of inequality that fail to take account of them may mis-identify the best 
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and worst off, and the positions in between. This is recognised by Robeyns’ (2017) ‘power of 
material resources’ formulation, which she proposes as the basis for defining a ‘riches line’, above 
which people are deemed to have ‘too much’. 
Thus we can argue that there are both instrumental and intrinsic reasons to expand inequalities 
analysis from means to ends. Doing so broadens our horizons to include types of inequality that 
otherwise remain hidden, and opens up the potential for new arguments about the normative 
significance of inequality. 
Multidimensionality 
One consequence of the shift in focus from means to ends is multidimensionality: money provides 
general-purpose means, and can therefore be employed as a one-dimensional metric, whilst ‘ends’ 
are varied and incommensurable. When we turn our attention from poverty to inequality, the 
multidimensionality of capability space has the potential to reveal important aspects of inequality 
that are missed by an exclusive focus on a money metric.  
In the first place, whilst measuring inequality with a money metric enables one to say that some 
people have more and some people have less, measuring inequality in multidimensional space 
allows the possibility to observe that some people can achieve different types of beings and doings 
from others – a difference in kind not just of degree. There are some functionings that are wholly 
unavailable to disadvantaged people, and which by that very fact form an important part of 
understanding inequality in functionings and capabilities. For example, the functioning of 
‘influencing public opinion’ is not available to the vast majority of ordinary people. They may be 
able to cast their vote, engage in debate with their neighbours and associates, or even participate 
in social media, but their influence on aggregate public opinion is typically minimal. By contrast, 
politicians, celebrities, journalists, and especially mass media owners, enjoy significant influence as 
individuals over public opinion. Moreover, the degree to which high levels of this functioning are 
concentrated in the hands of a few, or distributed across a broader section of society, varies 
substantially across places and periods. This seems an important part of the overall picture of 
inequality, and one that we would miss if we focussed exclusively on incomes.  
Another aspect of the multidimensionality that the CA brings to the study of inequality is the 
ability to examine correlation between levels of achievements across functionings, or correlation 
between capabilities. Returning to our example of the functioning of ‘learning’, and adding now 
the functioning of ‘health’, we can envisage one society in which low education and poor health 
are strongly correlated and high education and excellent health are likewise strongly correlated, and 
another society in which, despite a strong correlation at the bottom of both distributions, higher 
levels of education are not strongly predictive of particularly good health. To express it another 
way, we might be interested in whether there is a concentration of advantages across functionings, 
as well as the more familiar analysis of a concentration of disadvantages. Wolff and de-Shallit 
(2007) discuss the idea of fertile functionings – a virtuous circle in which improvement in one 
functioning leads to an improvement in another – and the opposite: corrosive disadvantage. The 
extent to which such concentrations exist are likely to influence our understanding of inequality 
between countries and within countries over time.  
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So conceiving of inequality multidimensionally has the potential to add to economic inequality in 
two significant ways: firstly, by revealing inequalites in kind – the different functionings and 
capabilities available to the well-off - as well as inequalities of degree; and secondly, by enabling us 
to understand concentrations of advantage (and disadvantage) across dimensions as an aspect of 
inequality.  
Freedoms 
A distinctive feature of ‘capability’ is that it embodies the concept of freedom. How much more 
real freedom do the most advantaged have than the least advantaged? Setting aside for the time 
being the philosophical and technical challenges in assessing ‘real freedom’ (Jones and Sugden, 
1982; van Hees and Wissenberg, 1999; Bavetta, 2004), one can see that the concept of capability 
inequality corresponds to an important intuition about the nature of inequality in the world as we 
know it. The advantage held by global and national elites resides not only in their vast fortunes, 
but also in the freedom they enjoy in other domains – in political influence, in geographical 
mobility, their room for legal manoeuvre, in security and in access to knowledge and information. 
Crucially, they do not necessarily need to actualise these freedoms in order to secure advantage –
the capability is often sufficient. And once again, although multi-dimensional advantage is in most 
cases associated with high levels of income and wealth, the strength of this association is not 
constant, so new insights are potentially generated by broadening the scope to include other 
dimensions. 
As noted above, extending the range of analysis from poverty and disadvantage, to inequality and 
advantage, brings into scope capabilities that harm other people. Indeed, several aspects of 
advantage, especially at the extreme, are manifested by the ability (if not the actuality) of exercising 
power over others. For example, the exploitation of other people’s labour, and of natural resources 
and the environment, the manipulation of political and legal systems, and the ability to threaten or 
carry out physical violence are all means by which advantage can be secured. Indeed Mosse (2010) 
argues that it is as a result of these mechanisms that poverty persists and McFarlane (2014) 
illustrates this with the example of India’s failure to provide access to clean and safe sanitation for 
disadvantaged groups – people from the dalit caste, women, dwellers in informal settlements, 
showing how this is the result of cultural, economic and political processes through which the 
more privileged protect and re-inforce their position. Dean (2009) criticises the capability approach 
for failing to recognise such power relationships. An account of distributional inequality in 
capability space will go some way towards addressing this gap.  
Freedom is an important aspect of advantage, and therefore of distributional inequality, and this 
is  better captured by the capability concept than income and wealth alone.  Developing an account 
along these lines could help to address the absence in the CA of a satisfactory analysis of power. 
Summary  
The focus of the CA on ends rather than means, its multidimensionality, and its explicit recognition 
of the value of freedom, produces new conceptual terrain and new avenues to explore empirically 
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in the study of distributional inequality. We can investigate the degree of ‘stretch’ in common 
functionings such as learning and health, and the shape of their distributions. We can identify 
additional functionings that are associated with advantage and unavailable to most, such as 
influencing public opinion, or the pursuit of ambitious agency goals. We can explore 
concentrations of high-level functioning as well as concentrations of disadvantage. And we can 
think about advantage as freedom from trade-offs between valuable ends, as well as incorporating 
capabilities that are harmful to others and thus extending the analysis of power in the CA.   
Issues for the capability approach arising from the focus on inequality 
The same features of the CA that open up new ways of thinking about inequality and advantage 
also bring challenges in their train. We discuss three in this section. These are: (1) the added 
complexity of the capability approach in investigating advantage – specifically the lack of a basis 
for agreeing a suitable capability list (which arises from multidimensionality), and the non-
observability of capabilities (which arises from the freedom-focus); (2) whether income and wealth 
should have any role in capability-inspired studies of inequality; and (3) the challenge posed by 
forms of advantage that can be difficult to understand without reference to resources. These last 
two issues return us to the question of whether analysis should, after all, focus on means or ends. 
Issue 1: The added complexity of the capability approach in contexts of advantage 
That the capability approach is more complex than unidimensional, resource-centric analysis is well-
recognised (e.g. Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007), owing to challenges around identifying valued 
dimensions, working with a multidimensional analytic framework, and so forth. However, there 
are at least two ways in which context of advantage accentuates widely-recognised challenges in 
terms of the complexity of applying the capability approach.  
The first arises from the selection of dimensions (the capability ‘list’), which is recognised as being 
of the central issues for those working with the approach (Hick and Burchardt, 2016). It has been 
previously observed that, in the context of disadvantage, various ‘lists’ of valued dimensions often 
have a common core (Alkire, 2010). Though there may be competing explanations for why such 
commonality emerges, we have suggested that one plausible explanation is that people have needs, 
which leads quite diverse studies in different geographical contexts to identify similar valued 
human ends (but which does not preclude particular studies including dimensions that others do 
not, and does not mean that the division of ‘concerns’ into dimensions will always be the same) 
(Burchardt and Hick, 2016). 
Nonetheless, if our aim is to identify those functionings that only advantaged people can achieve 
(or, at least, to include these in our analysis), then the list may become very long and heterogeneous 
indeed. In looking at achievement at the top, we no longer have “basic” dimensions to hang on 
to, and this inability to retreat to basic dimensions means that the complexity involved in a 
capability analysis of inequality would be considerably greater than an account where the focus is 
on disadvantage. There have been attempts to measure advantage directly using standard of living 
measures, rather than indirect income-based proxies (Ringen, 1988). For example, in Relative 
Deprivation and Social Justice, Runciman (1966) included not only a set of deprivation items in his 
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survey, but also a second set of items where ‘it was thought might be more naturally regarded as a 
prerogative of non-manual households’ (1966: 246). These asked respondents whether they had ‘a 
house you own’; ‘a fur coat for your wife’, ‘foreign holiday travel’, ‘spare bedrooms for visitors’, 
‘first-class travel on trains’; and ‘private education for children’ (1966: 359). But to truly measure 
advantage directly in a way that would compete with the income-centric approach would require 
capturing the conspicuous consumption of the super-rich – that is, their ‘consumption of luxuries’
(Veblen, 1994 [1899]: 45), and this is likely to prove rather more difficult. 
The second way in which a context of advantage adds to the complexity of the capability approach 
is because it makes the problem of the non-observable nature of people’s capabilities more 
significant. As Burchardt and Hick (2016) argue, the response of many authors working with the 
capability approach to the non-observable nature of people’s capabilities is, at an empirical level, 
to analyse their functionings, which are observable, and then use this information to draw 
inferences about their capabilities. For ‘basic’ capabilities or dimensions that are considered to be 
constitutive of human need, such inferences may seem plausible – when a person is homeless, one 
may assume that, in the vast majority of cases, that they do not have the ability be well-housed (or 
at least not without violating something else of fundamental importance, such as their physical 
safety or mental well-being).  
However, when it comes to the context of advantage – it is less clear that the absence of a particular 
functioning reflects a lack of capability. An analysis of 23 studies of the propensity of lottery 
winners to remain in employment found that between 61% and 93% of winners continued to work 
after winning the lottery (Paulsen, 2008). But we cannot assume, on this basis, that they did not 
have the ability to work less or give up work entirely, to become members of Veblen’s ‘leisure 
class’. Does the fact that a millionaire has not sought to influence the political process through 
corrupt donations mean that they could not do so if they desired? The point here is that, as we 
move away from ‘basic’ achievements, the relationship between capabilities and functionings is 
likely to be governed to a greater extent by the preferences of the individual. Thus, the freedom 
focus which, we argue, can be one of the distinctive contributions of the approach in 
understanding advantage may also increase the burden of operationalising of the approach.  
The essential question that these examples raise is how much complexity one needs to engage with 
in the study of inequality. Given the heterogeneity of non-basic capabilities, does it make sense to 
make the shift from income and wealth to functionings and capabilities in this context? Is the 
added “realism” trumped by the complexity introduced (i.e. the trade-off framed by Wolff and de 
Shalit, 2007)? We do not propose a once-and-for-all answer here, but we do believe that a focus 
on advantage, as opposed to the more traditional focus on disadvantage, alters the nature of this 
trade-off. 
Issue 2: The role of income and wealth in a capability-inspired study of advantage and disadvantage 
A second issue relates to the role, if any, that income and wealth should play in a capability-inspired 
study of inequality. At first glance, this may seem surprising: if one does not make the shift from 
resources to capabilities and functionings, then how can one seriously claim that a study is inspired 
by the capability approach at all? The means-ends distinction is argued by Robeyns (2016) to be 
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one of the essential features of the capability approach and some key applications, such as the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and Santos, 2010), employ direct measures of living 
standards rather than relying on income proxies. 
In order to understand the choice between resources and capabilities more clearly, we believe it is 
important to distinguish between conceptualisation and measurement of (dis)advantage. In the capability 
literature the resources-capabilities-utility choice is often discussed as one concerning the 
‘evaluative space’ (Robeyns, 2016: 407). For example, Sen (1993: 33) has argued that:  
‘the approach does not attach direct – as opposed to derivative – importance to the means of living 
or means of freedom (e.g. real income, wealth, opulence, primary goods, or resources), as some other 
approaches do. These variables are not part of the evaluative space, though they can indirectly 
influence the evaluation through their effects on the variables included in that space’ [emphases in 
original, subscript is ours]. 
But when one speaks of the ‘evaluative space’, does this refer to conceptualisation or measurement, 
or both?   
In terms of conceptualisation, we agree with Robeyns that any capability scholar will understand 
advantage and disadvantage in terms of what a person can do or be, and not in terms of the extent 
of their resources. A person’s capabilities are what we, fundamentally, are concerned about.
However, the question of how to measure advantage and disadvantage is pragmatic and essentially 
comparative. Theory alone cannot select the type of measures we employ. As Jenkins (2011: 29) 
argues, deciding between competing measures of poverty ‘is a matter of balancing principle and 
practice’, and Robeyns (2017) herself proposes a measure based on (adjusted) income and wealth 
to define ‘riches’. If there is a limitation of some capability scholarship, it is to treat questions of 
measurement as being, in essence, matters of principle, without paying sufficient attention to issues 
of practice. 
Where income measures, imperfect as they are, represent better proxies of the underlying 
capabilities than the measures of functionings that we have at our disposal, then it is not a departure 
from the capability approach to measure advantage and disadvantage using income and wealth (or, 
at least, to focus on income and wealth as measures of economic inequality, alongside other 
measures of non-economic inequality)(see also Hick, 2016a). This is particularly the case if our 
interest is in ‘advantage’, when direct measures of advantage are largely absent or may be of poor 
quality.  
While resource-centric approaches to measuring inequality may have their limitations in terms of 
capturing what people have rather than what they can do and be, they do have other advantages. 
One is that ‘the informational content is high in the sense of being able to discriminate between 
individuals to a fine degree’ (Jenkins, 2011: 26). If the concentration of resources at the top end of 
the income distribution matters (for example, a growing concentration income held by the top 1%) 
then it poses a challenge for those who have a preference for direct measurement of people’s 
functionings to identify sensitive measures that can capture this concentration and its effects.  
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Increasing concentrations of income and wealth at the top either will or will not lead to a widening 
inequality in what people can do or be (the former seems intuitively more likely to us). If it does 
not because, perhaps, the conversion rate between resources and functionings worsens (e.g. all 
income & wealth gains are swallowed by the costs of acquiring ‘positional’ goods), then this would 
be a finding of considerable importance and would confirm that the pursuit of wealth by those 
who are already rich is of questionable benefit, even to themselves. If, as seems more likely, the 
increasing concentration of wealth at the top will lead to increasing inequality of at least some 
capabilities, then we either need to continue to monitor income or wealth or we need a sufficiently 
sensitive set of measures to capture changes in capabilities at the top directly. The latter, we suggest, 
would pose an extremely demanding, and perhaps insurmountable, burden on measurement.  
Again, to emphasise, this is fundamentally a comparative question and not one of principle alone. 
At present, it is far from clear to us that such measures exist, at least in a comprehensive form (i.e. 
beyond one or two stylised examples). It is important that in making a principled shift from 
focusing on people’s resources to their capabilities, we do not select measures that are insensitive 
to real and meaningful changes in inequalities in society. The distinction between conceptualisation 
and measurement warrants greater discussion in the capability literature and using measures of 
income and wealth, provided they are analysed as proxies for underlying concepts of functioning 
and capability, is not precluded by the approach.  
Issue 3: There are things advantaged people do that are difficult to understand without reference 
to monetary resources 
In considering the contribution that the capability approach might make to the study of 
distributional inequality, we have sought to identify some functionings that only advantaged people 
can achieve, and which are typical, or at least reflective, of the experience of being advantaged. 
This has led us to the conclusion that there are forms of advantage that are the subject of much 
public discussion and interest and which are difficult to capture other than through a resource 
metric. That is, it is not just that analysis of resources may be required because satisfactory direct 
alternatives may not exist, but may be positively necessary. For example, a wealthy person may 
engage in (illegal) tax evasion or (legal) tax avoidance. They may engage in conspicuous 
consumption, searching for the honour, or status, that is conferred through the possession of 
wealth (Veblen, 1994 [1899]: 17). They may gift substantial sums of money to their children, for 
example, thus seeking to pass on some of a family’s accumulated advantages to the next generation. 
Inheritances typically conform to the Matthew principle – i.e. primarily benefitting the already 
advantaged (Szydlik, 2004). But to understand the significance of such activities in terms of their 
impact on inequality, we need to know the amounts involved. It matters if we are talking about 
£2,000 or £2m, or some value in between – even though the reason why it matters is not the value 
itself but because of the potential effects on the sorts of lives that people can lead – i.e. people’s 
capabilities. We cannot observe the capabilities with any degree of sensitivity or certainty, but we 
stand at least a sporting chance of observing and quantifying the flows of resources.  
A second aspect of advantage that is difficult to understand without reference to resources is the 
acquisition of wealth more generally. While a person may not utilise all of their income to improve 
their standard of living (by making savings, for instance), an implicit assumption by non-capability 
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scholars in contexts of disadvantage is that income acts as a reasonable proxy for standard of living. 
Where this proxy is believed to be flawed, some analysts, especially in developing countries, employ 
measures of consumption instead of income (see Jenkins, 2011: 26-30 for a discussion). 
However, in a context of advantage, a person may hold substantial wealth, and while this wealth 
might expand a person’s capability set dramatically (e.g. by enabling new functionings if they were 
to choose them, or by weakening the trade-offs between functionings), it may, in the short term, 
have a limited impact on their achieved functionings. Indeed, where wealth is not acquired for 
reasons of status or for immediate consumption, it is typically to increase a person’s capabilities at 
some point in the (sometimes distant) future. And yet, it is difficult to capture these enlarged 
capability sets by drawing inferences from information about people’s functionings, which has 
been the primary measurement approach adopted in empirical applications of the capability 
approach in the field of poverty analysis (see also Hick and Burchardt, 2016).  
Conclusion 
Inequality has acquired a newfound prominence in academic and political debate. The primary 
focus of recent scholarship on inequality has been on economic advantage and disadvantage and, in 
particular, the study of inequalities in income and wealth. In this paper we have sought to address 
two challenges - the first, to examine what a capability-inspired study of distributional inequality 
might look like and what it could contribute; and the second, to explore whether shifting our focus 
from poverty to inequality raises new issues for the capability approach, or casts a new light on 
some more familiar debates within the literature. 
We have argued that the multi-dimensional focus of the capability approach can provide new 
insights into distributional inequality. There is value in understanding not only the disparities 
between functioning poverty rates for different groups which has hitherto been the focus of much 
empirical work in the capability approach, but also the full distribution of achievement within any 
given valued dimension. The ‘stretch’ of the overall distribution of a functioning such as ‘learning’ 
varies across place and time in ways that are not fully captured by measures based on resources, 
because ‘means’ are translated into valuable ends at different rates for different people, at all points 
in the distribution, not just at the bottom.  Moreover, the concentration of advantages across 
dimensions also varies: an aspect of inequality that is unobserved where the focus is on a single 
metric such as income. The multi-dimensionality of the capability approach is therefore crucial, 
but so too is its emphasis on the possession and lack of freedoms. Advantage often consists in 
power over other people, and that power can be effective (through implicit threat) even when not 
translated into action: it is a form of freedom. So if we are to examine the full spectrum from 
disadvantage to advantage, and to make progress in undestanding the dynamic between them, the 
capability approach offers the right conceptual apparatus.  
However, we have argued that applying the capability approach to understand advantage is likely 
to add yet further complexity to an already complex approach, because of the greater difficulty in 
identifying important dimensions in contexts of advantage, and because of the reduced capacity to 
draw inferences about people’s capabilities on the basis of their observed functionings at the top 
of the distribution. Second, we have argued that while the means-end distinction and the 
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prioritisation of capabilities and functionings as the conceptual space is a key principle of the 
approach, the selection of measures to examine inequality empirically must be guided as much by 
practical concerns as by principles. This has implications in terms of how we understand the 
‘essence’ of the capability approach, and the role of monetary resources within it. Finally, we have 
argued that there are some beings and doings that are important in understanding advantage that 
are hard to understand without reference to resources, such as tax avoidance or evasion, or 
inheritance. The scale of these practices, in terms of their monetary value, is critical.  Taken 
together, these concerns lead us to conclude that income and wealth must be retained as measures 
of economic inequality, but supplemented by measures of achievements and power in other 
dimensions as well. 
We recommend a stronger and clearer distinction between concepts and measures. Capability 
inequality is a more appropriate and potentially revealing conceptual apparatus that opens up new 
terrain for enquiry, but economic resources are likely to remain a crucial metric for understanding 
distributional inequality for the forseeable future. 
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